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(88 C.Id 107. U3 P.Id IJl

[L. A. No. 21236.

In Bank. Oct. 24, 1950.)

Estate of JOHNSON THURSTON, Deceased. THOMAS B
'KUCHEL, as State Controller, etc., Appellant. v.
GEORGE W. TRAMMELL, as Executor, etc., e1. aI.,
Respondents.
[1] Ta.xation-Inheritance Taxatton-Tuable 'l'ransfen-Tranafera Inter ViV08.-A transfer "Of real property to the transferor's children by which be reserves a life estate in himself is
tuable under Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13644.
[2] Id. - Inh~itance Tuation - Taxable Transfers - Transfers
Inter Viv08.-Even tboujrb II tax attacbes to a transfer when
the transferor reserves 8 life estate ID the property, it can be
avoided by the subtlequent relinquishment of the life estate
before the death of the trtlll ..feror, it such relinquishment if.
not made in contemplation of death
(3) Id. -Inheritance Tuation - Tax!Lble 'l'ransfers - 'l'ransfers
Inter Vivos.-The express purpose of the provisions for the
taxation of specified "ltet" t"11011 transfers is to reach every
transfer made in lieu of or to avoid passing of property by
will or the laws of succession, and only such transfers are
subject to taxation.
[4] Id. - Inheritance Taxation - Taxable 'l'ransfers ~ Transfers
Inter Vivos.-The tax on transfers "lI,r
is not imposed on
transferS not in conteulplation of death to transferees whose
interest in and possession or enjoyment of the property are not
afiected by whether the transferor lives or dies, and it is immaterial whether such a transfer is accomplished by a single transaction or by an initial transfer and the subsequent relinquishment, not in contemplation of deatb, of the only interests
retained in the first transfer whose retention nntil the death
of the transferor would have resulted in the estate 0'1' inheritance taxation of the transfer.
.
[5] Id. - Inheritance Tuation - Taxable 'l'ransfers - 'l'ransfers
InterVivoS.-Although·an.mter "'1108 transfer is subject to an
inheritance tax, its taxability is determined by the restrictions
on the enjoyment and possession of the property at the death
of the transferor and Dot by the restrictions at the time of the
transfer.
[6] Id. - Inheritance Taxation - Taxable Transfers - 'l'ransfers
Inter Vivoa.-If. notwithstanding a transfer was taxable at tae

"'110'

[1] See 24 Cal.Jur. 451; 28 Am.Jur. SI.
McK. DiJ. References: [1-6, H-IOJ TlUlltion, 1430; [7] Taxation,

1434.

)

.I

208

ESTATB OJ' TBUBSToN

[36 C.2d

time it was made, the only retained interest Dpon which tu.
ation may be pred.icated is extinguished before the death of
the transferor, the in'er ,,",0. transfer is not aubjeet to the
inheritance taL
[7] ld.-Inheritance 'laxation-'lanble Transfers-Transfen iD
Oontemplation of Dea.th.-A life estate relinquished in contemplation of death is in the same category as if the transfer had
not been made and the tax is imposed as if it had been retained
untiJ the transferor's death.
[8] ld. -Inheritance 'laxation - Taxable Transfers - 'lraDsfen ,
Inter Vivos.-A tax measured by the vaJue of the entire corpus i
transferred caDDot be avoided by the payment of acoma81'&-1
tiOD equal to the value of the interest relinquished.
[9] ld. - Inheritance 'laxation - Taxable Tra.uafers - Tra.uafen
Inter Vivos.-Under Rev. & Tax. Code, § 18644, retention of
a life estate is treated as equivalent to ownership of the entire
corpus.
.
i
[10] ld.-Inheritance Taxation - Taxable 'lraDsfers - 'lraD8fen i
Inter Vivos.-Where an owner of real property conveys two
parcels thereof to his children, reserving a life eB~te ill eaell,
and later relinquishes the life estate in one parcel but not ba
contemplation of death, the relinquishment of aueh lite estate
is effective to preclude an inheritance tax of the transfer with
respect to that parceL

1

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Lot
Angeles County fixing inheritance tax. Fred MilIer, Judge.-

Affirmed.
.•11.
James W. Hickey, Chief Inheritance Tax Attorney, Morton
L. Barker, Deputy Inheritance Tax Attorney, Walter H. I
Miller and J. D. Lear, Assistant Inheritance Tax AttorneyI, 1
for A p p e l l a n t . j
George W. TrammeD,1n pro. per., for Responden1&

i
j

1

West, Vizzard, Howden & Baker as Amicus Curiae on behalf ..~
of Respondents.
J

i

TRAYNOR, J.-On October 3,1941, decedent conveyed two '-~:1
parcels of real property to his children, respondents herein, .. l
and reserved to himself a life estate in each. The transfer
was made without consideration, and a gift tax was paid
thereon, measured by the market value of the remainder interests transferred. On DecE'mber 29, 1942. decedent relinquished
to respondents his life estate in one of the two parcels, for

I
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which they paid him $10,000. The controller concedeS that
the consideration is adequate for the transfer of the life estate
and does not contend that the original transfer of the remainder interests or the subsequent relinquishment of decedent's
life estate in one of the parcels was made in contemplation of
death. Decedent retained his life estate in the other parcel
until his death on May 19, 1946.
The controller contends that an inheritance tax is due upon
the transfer of both parcels by the deed of October 3, 1941,
measured by their market value at the date of decedent's
death less the consideration paid for the relinquishment of
tht> life estate in one parcel, subject to a credit for the gift
tax paid upon the original transfer. Respondents concede
that the tax is properly imposed upon the transfer of the
parcel in which decedent retained a life estate until his death.
They object, however, to t.he report of the inheritance tax
appraiser including as taxable the transfer of the parcel in
which decedent relinquished his life estate. The trial court
sustained respondents' objections and entered an order fixIng
the inheritance tax due. The controller appeals from that
order.
Section 13644 of the Rt'!venue and Taxation Code provides
that "A tr~sfer' conIormhig to Section 13641 -iuia -·1inaer·'-'-which the transferor expressly or impliedly reserves for his
life an income or interest in the property transferred is a
transfer subject to this part." No provision is made for the
avoidance of the tax by the subsequent relinquishment of the
reserved life estate. The controller therefore contends that the
taxable event is the transfer with the reservation ·of a life
PStat.e, that the tax attaches at that time, and that its imposition is not affected by the subsequent relinquishment of the life
t'state upon which the tax is predicated. Respondents contend,
however, that the tax is imposed only upon the beneficial succession t.o property at death and that, unless a transfer .of
ownership is effected at the death.of the decedent, the tax cannot be sustained.
The inheritance tax is primarily a tax upon the succession
to property at death. The statute expressly includes as subjects of inheritance taxation transfers of property by will.
succession, or survivorship, and transfers of the proceeds of
life insurance. An inheritance tax limited to the taxation of
transfers from thE' dead to the living, however, could be
easily avoided. "1'he common and perhaps not unnatural
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aversion of property owners to the burdens of taxation appears
to -have applied with special force to the dimirlution of the
estates left by them at death through the imposition of estate.
inheritance, or succession taxes. The early statutes taxing
property passing by will or inheritance were followed by resort'.
to various means for avoiding subjection to the tax. Among
the devices most simple and commonly resorted to were gifts
in contemplation of death. and transfers, in trust or other·
wise. whpreby the transferor reserved to himself the life use
or in('ome for life. These artifices were met by 'provisions in
the taxing statutes calculated t.o closE' such avenues of tai'
avoidance." (Blodgett v. Guaranty Trust Co., 114 Conn.:
207, 211-212 [158 A. 245) ; Matter of Keeney, 194 N.Y. 281,
287 [87 N.E. 428] ; Belvering v. BulLard. 303 U.S. 297,302 l58\
S.Ct. 565. 82 L.Ed. 852] ; .t1 illike?! v Pnited Stafes, 283 U.S.
15,20 [51 S.Ct. 324,75 L.Ed. R091 ; "-;.~t(1fe nt Potter. 188 Cal.
55, 63 [204 P. 826).) RE'venlll' and THxation Code. sections,
13641-13648, accordingly provide for thf' taxation of §PecifiE'd '
snter vivos transfers by which the ownpr of property rE'tains
such an interest therein or imposes such restrictions upon the
nse thereof that for tax purposes be is rellardf'd ftR the owner
of the property at his death and his tranRff'r tlirrE'of as a
_testamentary ,disposition .•• The statute taxes not ml"l'e1Y'TI1ose
interests which are deemed to pass at death according to j
refined technicalities of the Jaw of propprty.1t alRo -taXf'S-i
i~ter ~i?os transfers that. are too much akin t~ testamelltary 1
disposltlons not to be subJected to the same eXCIse." (H elver- i
sng v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 112 [60 S.Ct. 444, 84 L.E,1. 604, !
125 A.L.R. 1368 J; Estate of Potter, supra, 63; Charnbl rli v.
Lamb, 186 Cal. 261, 266 [199 P. 33] ; Klein v. United States, !
283 U.S. 231, 234 [51 S.Ct. 398, 75 L.Ed. 9961; Goldstone v. ,
United States, 325 U.S. 687, 692 [65 S.Ct. 1323, R9 L.Ed..
1871, 159 A.L.R. 1320]; Oommissioner v. C"rd"ZfI'l1 El1iafe.
173 F.2d 19, 27; Oommissioner v. Hager's g.~tafe, 173 F.2J
613, 616; In re Estate of Rising, 186 Minn. 56, 63-64 1242
N.W. 459); Oochran v. McLaughlin, 129 Conn. 176, 182 127 \
A.2d 120) ; Blodgett v. Guaranty Trust 00., 114 Conn. 207, \
219 [158 A. 245] ; see 1 Paul, Estate and Gift Taxation. § 2.13, .
p. 140; Eisenstein, Another Glance at the H "l1l)ck Problem, '
1 Tax L.Rev. 430. 438-439; ct., Helvering v. Olij)'ord, 309 U.S.
331.334 160 S.Ct. 554.84 L.Ed. 7881; Du Pont v. Oommis'sioner, 289 U.S. 685, 689 [53 S.Ct. 766. 77 L.Ed. 14471.) 'fhe
tax is impost'd on the infer vivos transfer but its collection is
post pOlled until the death of the transferor, and it is measured

I
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by the market value of tht' transferred property at the date
of his death. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13402; Chambers v. Lamb,
186 Cal. 261, 266 (199 P. 331; E8tateof Potter, 188 Cal. 55,
5!l [204 ·P. 826) ; Chambers v. Gibb, 186 Cal. 196, 198 [198 P.
1032] ; Estate of M1Lrphy, 182 Cal. 740. 744, 747 1190P 461;
Central Hanover Bank &- Trust Co. v Kelly, 319 U.S. 94. fl7.M
163 S.Ct. 945, 87 L ..Ed. 12821 ; see. also. Pidelif,I·Philadelph IfJ
Tru.~f Co. v. Rothen.<;1ei<. H24 U.S. 108. 110 l6fi Ret. 508. ~!I
L.Rd. 783, 159 A.L.R. 2271; Plick'lI Eiliofe v CnmrlH.~stOn'·f.
HiG F.2d 733. 739; 58 Yale L.Jour. 313. 311' \ [1] TIlt'
trlllliifE'r of Octob('r ~. 1941. by which decedpn' re~f'rved 8 lil'p
I'statl' in the propprty wa.c; thprefore taxA bit' under RPcUon
13644.
[2] Eyen thou~h a tax attaches to a transfer whpn 'he
transferor has reSl'rved a life p~tate in the property. howevt'l.
it (~an be avoided by the Ruhst'quent relinqlliRhment of thE'
lift' E'state bpfore the death of the transferor. if Rnch rplm·
qlliRhment is not made in contE'mplation of dpath. [8) Tlw
('xpress purposE' of thl;' provifuonR for thE' ta~f1tion of .. pel·Ilil'd
tnter 1Jit'Q.~ transfl'r~ is to reach "p"ery trandl'r milo!' In liP"
of or to avoid the pa~sing of property by will or tht' lawl- (If
Sl1N!!'ssion." (Rev & TIIX Corle. &
. 13648. E.tat,. (It Pfltlf'r.
SI/T}ro. 63). and only ;Inch transfpn; are suh.wI·t to<taxatHm.
(4) Thl' taxis not imposed on transfprs nut in ('ontempllltlOn
of df'ath to transferees whose intl'rl'Rt m and posst'R."ion or
I'lJjoyment of the property are not atfectl'it by whether the
tran~feror lives or dies. It is immaterial wtH'ther such 8 transfer is accomplished by a single transaction or. aR in the present
caSE', by an initial transfer and the subseqnent relinquishment,
not in contemplation of death. of the only interests retained
in thl' first transfer whosp retl'ntion until the death of the
trflnsfpror would have resulted in the p.~tate or inheritance
taxation of the transfer. (AUen v. Trll.lIf Co. of Georgia. 326
U.S 630.636,637 166 Ret. 389.90 L.Efl 3671.)
[5] Although the mtrr Vt1l011 transfer is thl' !'Il1hject of the
tax (Helvering v IJaflock. supra. 112). itR taxability is determined by the restri(,tion~ on thf' t'njoyment anit possession of
the property at the death of the transferor, and Dot by the
restrictions at the time of t.he transfer. [6] If, notwitbstanding that the transfer was taxable at the time it was
made, the only retained interest upon which taxation may be
predicated is extinguished'bpfore the death of the transferor,
the inter trivos transfer is not Bubject to the inheritance tax.

,
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(See Rottschaefer, Taxation of Transfers Taking Effect in
Possession at Grantor', Death, 26 Iowa L.Rev. 514,526.) "The
disappearance of a decedent's reversionary interest, togetber
with the resulting estate tax liability, prior to death through :
events beyond decedent's control is a possibility in many situa·
tions such as the one in issue. . . . But the imposition and
computation of the ~tate tax are based upon the interests in
actual existence at the time of decedent's death." (Goldstone
v. United States, 325 U.S. 687, 693 [65 S.Ot. 1323, 89 L.Ed:·
1871, 159 A.L.R. 1320] ; Allen v. Trust Co. of Georgia; supra,
637. Fidel·ity.Philadelpkta Trust Co. v. Bothensies, 324 U.S.
108, III [65 S.Ot. 508, 89 L.Ed. 783, 159 A.L.R. 227] ; Estate
of Madison, 26 Ca1.2d 453, 457, 462·463 [159 P.2d 630].) This
reasoning has been invoked by several state courts to permit
the avoidance of inheritance taxation by the inter vivos relin·
quishment of a reserved life estate under statutes, providing
for the inheritance taxation of a transfer in which such life
estate was reserved. (Lamb's Estate v. Morrow, 140" Iowa
89 [117 N.W. 1118, 18 L.R.A.N.S. 2261; Brown v. Gulliford,
181 Iowa 897 [165 N.W. 182] ; People v. Welch's Estate. 235
Mich. 555 [209 N.W. 930] ; see Rottschaefer, 81lpra; cf., Harf- !
ford v. Martin, 122 N.J.L. 283. 288 [4 A.2d 31, 121 A.L.R...]
354].)
i
After the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 169 8.Ct. 322;1
93 L.Ed. 288], which overruled May v. Hemer, 281 U.S. 238
[50 8.et. 286, ;4 L.Ed. 826, 67 A.L.R. 1244], and held that·
transfers made before March 3. 1931, in which the transferor
r(>served a life elltAfe in the transferred property, were taxable
IInoer the provisions of Internal Revenue Code, section
811 ( c)·. it was generally assumed that the relinquishment
of such life estates would preclude the inclusion of the trust
corpus in the grm;."1 estate of the transferor, unless the relinquishment were accomplished in contemplation of death. (See
Bittker, Th./! Chtlrch and Spiegel Cases, 58 Yale L.Jour. 825,
857 -858; Pavenstedt, Congress Deactivates Another Bombshell,
5 Tax L.Rt>v. 309. 336: Schuyler, Escape from Spiegel, 44 JIl.
L.Rev. 131. 142·14!l. 148: Looker, Estate Taxation of Living
!

I

*iflternal Rev8flutI Code. 811: .. The value of the gr088 estate of the
decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of hill
death of all property . . .
.. (e) To the extent of any interest therein of whieh the decedent
baa at any. time made a transfer ..•
I I (C) intended to take effect in posseallion or enjoyment at or after
hill death."

Oct. 1950]
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Truds.49 Columb.L.Rev. 437, 441. 452-453; ::17 CRI.L.Rev. 134.t
141-142.) The same assumption has apparently been made
by Congress itself. Recognizing that many per~ons who had
retained life estates created before March 3, 1931 in reliance
on May v. Hemer would relinquish them to avoid the inclu(lioll of the transferred property in their gross estates, Congress provided (P. L. No. 378, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.) that 'Such
life estates might be relinquished during 1949 and 1950 without liability for gift tax thereon and without incurring the
rj~k that such relinquishment, insofar as it was made to avoid
estate taxes, might be deemed made in contemplation of
death. Under the rule of the Allen and Goldstone cases that
"the imposition and computation of the estate tax are based
upon the interests in actual existence at the time of.decedent's
dl'ath," the relinquishment of such life estates would clearly
preclude taxation of the original transfer in which such lifp
estates were retained, just as would the relinquishment Ilf
decedent's life estate in the present case.
Estate of Madison, 26 Ca1.2d 453 [159 P.2d 630], on which
the controller relies, does Dot support his position. [n that
case, he did not seek to tax the parts of the original transfpr
to the trustee that bad" been obtained by the benefici"arigs
with the trustee"s consent before the donor's death. ··Only
the balance remaining in the trusts at the time of the fathE-r's
death" was taxed. (26 Ca1.2d 453. 462.) Thus, the controller
in effect conceded that those parts that became complE.'ted gifts
bC'fore the transferor's dE.'ath were not taxable. It was emphasized that the trustor had made the gift in trust "110 that. for
the rest of his lifetimE.', the principal would be kept intact
and the income would be paid to thE.' family of which he wa.'> the
head. . . . The respondents' interests were contingent upon
their surviving the trustor. Each trust contained spendthrift
provisions 80 that the beneficiaries could n~ither dispose of
their interest in the corpus (citing eases) nor request that
the trusts be terminated before the trustor's death. (Citation.)
Moreover, irrespective of spendthrift provisions, the trusts
could not be so terminated, since other persons, some perhaps
not yet born, had possible interests in the trust property.
(Citing cases.)" (Estate of Madison, R1tpt"a, 464, 465.)
In contrast to the Madison case, the gifts here wer~ fV)t
in trust and the trustor placed no shacklt's on thE.' property
that could not be and were not removed before his dE.'ath. Hil'!
children were the absolute owners of the realty for more than

-
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three years before his deatb and could do with it what they
wished.
The controller contends, however, that a construction of
section 13644 contrary to his own would permit a transferor
to make an essentially testamentary disposition of his property and thereby evade the inheritance tax. He contends that .
a transfer reserving a life estate may be made under circum- I
stances precluding the assertion that it was made in contem- :
plation of death, and the transferor may retain his life estate-!
until he feels that death is imminent. It is feared that he
could then, in contemplation of death. relinquish his life
estate to the remaindermen, paying inheritance taxes, if any,
on the transfer of the life estate only. ,Thus, the value of the
parcel transferred to respondents is $134,000, and the value
of the relinquished life estate $10.000. If decedent retained
the life estate until his death, the tax would be measured by
the full value of the property. By relinquishing his life estate
in contemplation of death, the decedent could at!complisb a
testamentary disposition subject to inheritance taxation of only
a fraction of the value of the transferred property.
The controller's apprehension is unfounded. Certain inter
vivos transfers of property by which the transferor retains
sufficient control over or interest in the transferred property
are treated as testamentary dispositions. (E.g., Commissioner
v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (69 S.Ct. 322, 93 L.Ed.
288J; Estate of Spiegel, 335 U.S. 701 [69 S.Ct. 301, 93
L.Ed. 330J; Estate of Madison, 26 Cal.2d 453 [159 P.2d
630J.) If the control or interest is retained until the
transferor's death, the tax is imposed as if the transferor
had remained the owner of the property until his death,
and disposition of the property had been through his estate.
The testamentary effect of the earlier transfer cannot be
altered by a later testamentary transfer, either by will
or in contemplation of death. (Ct., Allen v. Trust Co. of
Georgia, 326 U.S. 630, 637 [66 S.Ct. 389, 90 L.Ed. 367].) There
is no reason to favor the transferor who relinquishes his interest in contemplation of death over the taxpayer who retains
the shackles on the property until his death. '" For the purposes of the [estate or inheritance] tax, property transferred
by the decedent in contemplation of death is in the same
category as it would have been if the transfer had not been
made and the transferred property had continued to be owned
by the decedent up to the time of his death." (Igleheart v.
CO'fn.missioner, 77 F.2d 704, 711; In re Kroger'8 Estate, 145

Oct. 1950J

215

ESTA.TE OF THURSTON
[18 C.2d 207; 223 P.2c:I 121

F.2d 901, 908; Estate of Koussevitsky, 5 T.C. 650, 660; Edate
of Hornor, 44 B.T.A; 1136.) [7] The life estate relinquished
in contemplation of death is therefore "in the same category
as it would have been if the transfer had not been made," and
the tax is imposed as if it had been retained until the transferor'8 death. [8] A tax measured by the value of the
entire corpus transferred cannot be avoided by the payment
of a consideration equal to the value of the .interest relinquished. [9] Under section 13644, retention of the life
estate is treated as equivalent to the ownership of the entire
corpus; its relinquishment in contemplation of death is therefore equivalent to a testamentary disposition of the entire
corpus. The requirement of adequate consideration is designed
"to prevent a man from diminishing his taxable estate by
creating obligations not meant correspondingly to increase it,
but intended as gifts or a means of distributing it after his
death. " (Oommissioner v. Porter, 92 F .2d 426, 428.) It
follows that a transfer in contemplation of death that reduces
the transferor's taxable estate is not supported by adequate
consideration within the meaning of the tax statutes. (Phillips
v. Gnichtel, 27 F.2d 662, 665; Latty v. Oommissioner, 62 F.2d
952,954; see 37 Cal.L.Rev. 134, 141-142.)
[10] IIi the present case, there is no question of attempted
tax evasion. It is not contended that the relinquishment of
the retained interest was in contemplation of death. The transfer and relinquishment are equivalent to an outright transfer
in which the grantor, before his death and not in contemplation of death, has alienated all interest in or control over the
property. The relinquishment of the life estate was therefore effective to preclude inheritance taxation of the transfer
of October 3, 1941, with respect to the parcel as to which it
was relinquished.
The order is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J. Schauer, J ..
and Spence, J., concurred.
t

Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied November 20, 1950.
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